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Abstract 
Purpose 
This paper outlines a strategy for research development focused on addressing the 
neglected role of visual perception in real life tasks such as policing surveillance and 
command and control settings. Perception is much less well documented and 
investigated than the roles of social psychology or memory in general policing 
research, both of which are well established and have led to changes in policing 
policy procedure and practice.   
Approach  
The scale of surveillance task in modern control room is expanding as technology 
increases input capacity at an accelerating rate. We review recent literature 
highlighting the difficulties that apply to modern surveillance and give examples of 
how poor detection of the unexpected can be, and how surprising this deficit can be. 
Perceptual phenomena such as Change Blindness are linked to the perceptual 
processes undertaken by law-enforcement personnel. 
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Practical implications  
We outline a scientific programme for how detection deficits can best be addressed in 
the context of a multidisciplinary collaborative agenda between researchers and 
practitioners. The development of a cognitive research field specifically examining 
the occurrence of perceptual ‘failures’ provides an opportunity for policing agencies 
to relate laboratory findings in psychology to their own fields of day-to-day enquiry.  
Originality/value of paper  
We show, with examples, where interdisciplinary research may best be focussed on 
evaluating practical solutions and on generating useable guidelines on procedure and 
practice. We argue that these processes should be investigated in real and simulated 
context-specific studies to confirm the validity of the findings in these new applied 
scenarios. 
 
 [Abstract 250 Words, including headings.] 
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Introduction  
Readers who have worked in, or visited a control room will testify to the large amount 
of data that is being processed by operation team group members in auditory and 
visual formats. This environment produces visual load at both the macro and the 
micro levels of analysis. On the one hand, individual monitoring of single visual 
sources such as TV monitors (the micro level) provides, alongside audio, the raw data 
for any command and control room; on the other hand, executive oversight of huge 
amounts of information, much of it visual, is required by commanders to facilitate 
effective resource management (the macro level). Layered on top of this are 
operational concerns about both short- and long-term accountability. These 
accountability issues place an additional constraint on decision making at strategic, 
tactical and operational levels.  
Such control-room operations place a huge demand on the human visual 
system, yet almost all of our visual processing is seemingly effortless and automatic. 
We feel as though we see the world in its infinite richness and technicolour detail. 
Indeed, much of the research literature in this area about basic visual perceptions 
centres on the complex sensitivity of the human visual system (e.g. Graham, 1989). 
We are able to recognise and name thousands of faces, recall many more thousands of 
scenes from visual memory and detect minute changes in orientation, brightness or 
alignment. This overarching feeling of visual completeness can unfortunately lead to 
an overestimation of our visual abilities. In this paper we show how cognitive science 
allows us to begin to quantify just how justified is our implicit faith in the human 
visual system. We then examine to what extent a scientific approach to the human and 
technological factors surrounding the development of a scalable approach to volume 
surveillance can inform and improve homeland security. We argue that this can be 
Detect the unexpected: a science for surveillance. 
6  09/03/2008 
achieved via an analytic approach to the transfer of information from first responder 
to an incident to the overall strategic and tactical command. 
 
Limitations of human perception in surveillance: Change Blindness. 
A recent and growing body of literature has highlighted rather surprising failures in 
visual perception – so called ‘change blindness’ (Rensink, O’Regan & Clark, 1997; 
Rensink, 2002; Simons and Rensink, 2005). A demonstration typically involves 
introducing unexpected changes to visual scenes. Contrary to observers’ own 
expectations, changes introduced during blinks, flickers, or disruptions can be very 
hard to spot. What distinguishes the demonstrations of these lapses in visual 
performance from previous literature (showing the notable achievements of visual 
performance) is that they are typically demonstrated with naturalistic scenes; this 
contrasts with the stylised arrays of primitive objects normally used by cognitive 
scientists. Despite (or perhaps because of) the familiarity of the scene, observers are 
surprised when they cannot easily detect changes introduced to the scenarios. For 
example a typical demonstration involves the presentation of flickering scene on a TV 
screen; every alternate presentation of the scene incorporates a change to the scene 
(such as removal of an object from the scene). Provided the scene flickers are 
interspersed with short grey blank intervals, it can be infuriatingly difficult to spot that 
something as obvious as an aeroplane engine, a tree, or an animal has been 
‘photoshopped’ from the picture (Rensink et al., 1997)[1].  
These demonstrations may not immediately appear to be relevant to the tasks 
of observers in CCTV control rooms. However, the crucial determinant of whether or 
not these ‘changes’ are detected is the amount of visual disruption used. Blinks 
(Grimes, 1996), blanks (Rensink et al, 1997) and other transient ‘splashes’ (O’Regan 
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et al., 1999) appear to devastate the visual system resulting in a surprising loss of 
visual detection performance. In this context, the average CCTV system can be 
considered as a ‘change blindness’ machine. By necessity the system must flick 
between multiple views of a complex scene to try and capture as much information as 
possible. The decoupling of space and time that this introduces, makes perception of 
events much harder than we might expect from our own performance in ‘the real 
world’ (i.e. with single viewpoint, full uninterrupted views). The same paradigm has 
been used to demonstrate surprising levels of performance decrements for changes in 
road traffic scenes (e.g. Caird, Edwards, Creaser and Horrey, 2005). It was the work 
of Grimes (1996) that showed just how pervasive change blindness could potentially 
be, changes made literally during the blink of an eye (using sophisticated eye-tracking 
technology) rendered large scene changes undetectable.  
 
Inattentional Blindness 
One form of ‘change blindness’ is ‘inattentional blindness’ (Mack and Rock, 1998) 
and perhaps the most famous demonstration of inattentional blindness is the widely 
publicised ‘Gorillas in our Midst’ experiment by Simons and Chabris (1999). A 
number of viewers of a basketball game were asked to engage in a simple video 
monitoring task (counting the number of passes made by the white team during the 
game). This lead to a focussing of attention strong enough to result in the viewers’ 
failure to spot a person in a gorilla suit walking over to the middle of the court, 
beating its chest, then walking off. Viewers allowed to simply watch the game, 
unencumbered with an additional task, spotted the gorilla straight away. Likewise, 
viewers concentrating on the pass completions of the black shirted team also readily 
spotted the gorilla. In the context of these widely replicated research findings (e.g. 
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Levin, Simons, Angelone, & Chabris; 2002) the relationship to this rather amusing 
seemingly innocuous demonstration becomes clearer. The following two examples 
will help cement the idea for the reader to understand the relevance of this scientific 
phenomenon to police and other agents of social control. On the one hand, 
surveillance techniques have been shown to be dramatically successful at identifying 
hard to spot people and incidents (e.g. identifying the London Bombers from 
thousands of hours of videotape (Knight, 2005)). On the other hand, when observers 
are overly focussed on certain aspects of a vigilance task they can miss obvious clues 
to criminal activity. The misdirection of attention accidentally induced by the media 
during the Washington Sniper crisis (Coppola, 2005) is a dramatic case in point: a 
white van reported to be linked to the snipers proved to be a complete red herring and 
diverted valuable resources and attention away from the blue sedan driven by the two 
men responsible. 
 
Change Blindness Blindness 
Rather worryingly, even after people are made aware of these widely documented 
‘failures’ of perception arising from change blindness and even once they have 
experienced them themselves, they still overestimate their ability to detect unexpected 
changes, by as much as 30%, (Levin, Momen, Drivdahl, & Simons, 2000). Levin et 
al., (2000) call this overestimation ‘change blindness’ blindness. Some might say that 
this misperception may only arise through the bizarre nature of some of the changes 
used in these demonstrations. However, subsequent ‘live-action’ experiments (e.g. 
Angelone, Levin, & Simons, 2003) have used more conventional changes familiar to 
practitioner contexts: namely, object ‘removal’ (theft) and person-changes (identity-
swops during victim distraction). The links with theft and the use of disguise to avoid 
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detection and apprehension are more obvious when members of the public are 
engaged in ‘live-action’ swaps of conversation partners such as these [2]. Such 
credibility criticisms might also been levelled at the photographic demonstrations of 
change blindness (e.g. Rensink et al., 1997). In real life, it could be argued that scenes 
do not rapidly alternate every fraction of a second – and the inability to detect such 
changes is neither surprising nor problematic. However, the modern environment is 
much less predictable and stable than the forest or savannah environment that our 
visual system evolved to deal with (Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992; Walls, 
1967). Modern computer operating systems, CCTV systems and TV-channels can all 
switch between many different outputs in the blink of an eye – a perfect environment 
for change blindness. Even in situations when we are aware that there may be the 
possibility of change blindness, because of our natural overconfidence (‘change 
blindness’ blindness) we are still liable to miss dramatic changes in visual scenes 
(Levin et al. 2000). A classic example of this phenomenon is the Fathers for Justice 
campaigners who managed to penetrate surprisingly far into secure parts of London 
wearing highly conspicuous superhero costumes (e.g. Johnston and Alleyne, 2004). 
The examples above might serve to dishearten the practitioner, when faced 
with surprising examples of the potential weakness and vulnerability of any 
observation based system. However, the above examples also demonstrate the long-
term solution for dealing with these issues: namely the revelation of the fact that these 
phenomena are amenable to psychological investigation and quantification. 
Seemingly abstract and intangible processes can be described and quantified with 
appropriate techniques. Once understood, interventions can be implemented to 
mitigate the worst effects of these phenomena.  For example, Rensink (2000) has 
shown that the feeling of perceiving a change, ‘without quite knowing what the 
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change might be’, is measurable. In what he rather cleverly terms ‘mindsight’, he used 
a change blindness flicker paradigm that initially contained no change between 
flickered presentations of the scene. Then, after a predetermined number of 
alterations, a change was introduced and participants were asked to make two key 
presses: one when they thought that a change occurred, another when they had 
identified it. This experimental paradigm indicated that there is a delay of several 
seconds between the initial awareness of ‘a’ change and the final conscious detection 
of the nature of the change. It is as if the gut feeling exists prior to conscious 
recognition. 
As we have seen above, Cognitive Sciences can begin to document, quantify 
and estimate the extent of previously intractable psychological processes. Gladwell 
(2005) provides a very accessible introduction point for the development of a view of 
the pros and cons of relying on these ‘gut feelings’ in perceptual judgments and he 
calls the rapid initial formation of such opinions ‘thin slicing’ (i.e. taking an expert, 
but quickly formed, judgement). In particular he shows how broader themes in human 
judgment are beginning to be tapped into by Cognitive Sciences. Once documented 
and delineated, suitable interventions or solutions can then be developed and tested.  
The applied cognitive psychology approach has already served and continues 
to serve the non-visual aspects of policing, for example in relation to witness 
testimony a quantitative, scientific approach has delivered tangible innovations in 
procedure and practice in the context of human memory. From an evidential point of 
view, the very nature of retrieving memories can, it seems, induce forgetting of 
related memory representations (e.g. Anderson, Bjork and Bjork, 1994; Shaw, Bjork 
and Handal, 1995). The most relevant example of this is the finding that having 
viewed a scene (say a ‘crime scene’ of a college dormitory) subsequent repeated 
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retrieval practice of a subset of items (e.g., Harvard college sweaters) to be learned 
from within a category of objects (e.g. college sweaters) reduced recall performance 
for unpracticed items in the same category. Recall for items from different categories 
(e.g., college books) remained unaffected by the additional practice (Shaw, Bjork and 
Handal, 1995). On a practical level this puts observers in a position where ongoing 
sequences of surveillance and pursuit may produce unexpected impairments in 
performance, impairments that would not necessarily be apparent in subsequent 
debriefs or in court. Clearly this can have potentially catastrophic consequences to the 
overall outcomes in cases reliant on witness testimony.  However, more recent 
research highlights the more subtle nature of this phenomenon. MacLeod and Macrae 
(2001) have shown how separation of guided retrieval practice from a final recall test 
can eliminate the incidence of ‘retrieval-induced forgetting’. This has implications for 
the way that overt and covert surveillance in all its forms is implemented. In particular 
the selection of material appropriate for dissemination and transmission between 
operatives is crucial, yet the efficacy of different types of information is still poorly 
understood. Only a systematic exploration of this phenomenon in realistic 
(ecologically valid) surveillance and pursuit contexts will reveal the extent of the 
problem and the possible solutions.  
 
A Scientific Approach to Surveillance 
In this section we review the applicability of attention-related psychological concepts, 
phenomena and findings to the research agenda for effective surveillance in modern 
society. In the same way that additional recall items have a cost in the context of 
retrieval induced forgetting (as discussed above), each and every item that is 
transmitted throughout the command chain has an associated potential cost. The more 
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(possibly unnecessary) extra information that is passed on, the greater the possibility 
there is of over-focusing on potentially misleading or irrelevant information. For 
example, if appearance in a target is incorrectly identified or recalled, then the 
potential exists for spectacular misdirection of attention (e.g. Gorillas in our midst 
(Simons and Chabris, 1999), Washington Sniper (Coppola, 2005)). Over-focusing is 
broad topic but at least part of it has been the subject of systematic applied research 
under the term of ‘attentional set’ (e.g., Most, Scholl, Clifford, & Simons, 2005). 
Essentially, this is the notion that observers can simplify a task by focusing attention 
into a reduced (relatively manageable) subset of objects for scrutiny in a complex 
scene. The relevance attentional set in vigilance related tasks (e.g. vehicle driving) has 
been clearly demonstrated by Most and Astur (2007). In their experiment, participants 
were asked to navigate by obeying directions indicated by either a yellow or a blue 
turn-sign appearing at intersections in the driving simulator that they were using. At a 
subsequent intersection either a blue or a yellow motorcycle would unexpectedly 
career into their path and block the road. Bikes that did not match attentional set (i.e. 
bikes with a non-congruent colour to the target) were detected less quickly leading to 
substantially greater collisions rates in those non-congruent conditions. This shows 
how from moment to moment, the attentional set of the observer can influence the 
uptake of information from the visual array, much like the observers in Simons and 
Chabris (1999) Gorilla experiment who were tracking the passes from the white team. 
These observers were least likely to spot the unexpected event (the black gorilla). 
Caird, Edwards, Creaser, Horrey (2005) have shown a much more long-term 
influence of attentional set using a very similar paradigm. Again in the domain of 
traffic scene perception they used a variation of Rensink et al’s (1997) ‘flicker 
paradigm’ to probe the decision accuracy of observers for changes to the pictorial 
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information contained in photographs of traffic intersections. Changes consisted of 
alterations to a single object: either a pedestrian, a vehicle, a sign or a traffic control 
device. Older participants showed reduced levels of accuracy in ‘go/no-go’ decisions 
for photographs of traffic intersections. In particular, older drivers appeared to show 
more reliance on traffic control devices at the expense of other types of hazards.  
Additional inspection time served to mitigate against the likelihood of decision errors, 
fortunately.  The full explanation of the mechanism underlying this result is still a 
matter of debate, but the relevance to surveillance is clear. Age and experience 
dramatically influence the way that observers see the world (based on the expected 
likelihood of possible events); this influence can be malign or benign depending on 
the training, experience and circumstances of the viewing.  
We have seen how dramatically perception can ‘fail’ our expectations. 
Fortunately the incidence of these failures (or more properly ‘misperceptions’) can be 
assessed and quantified. Optimal viewing conditions can make items, that might 
otherwise be invisible, trivially easy to spot. Within the population, individual 
differences in performance on such vigilance tasks clearly exist based on experience; 
and this means that appropriate training should enhance overall performance. 
Accordingly we propose that a coordinated research endeavour uniting academia and 
the policing community be developed to tackle the issue of misperception with a view 
to generating innovation in policy, procedure and practice. 
Recent research has attempted to tackle closely related training issues in a 
multidisciplinary approach by looking in detail at the way in which ‘field settings’ can 
be re/created in virtual reality contexts e.g. immersion labs (e.g., Christou, and 
Bulthoff, 2000; Reicher, Sani, Cassidy and Cronin, 2004). ‘Visual immersion’ is the 
key tool to promote a feeling of ‘presence’ in participants– to make them feel as 
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though they are fully engaged in a realistic approximation of reality (e.g., see 
Lombard & Ditton (1997) for a review of the concept of ‘presence’ in virtual 
environments). Visual immersion is achieved by using large-scale projection screens 
on multiple walls of the laboratory. The experience of realism is further enhanced by 
the use of sound amplification, which permits the exploration of the complexity of 
multi-modal presentation and its effects on perceptual processing. The ability to 
present hi-resolution broadcast quality visuals in real-time to the immersion lab (and 
to record the participants responses) allows for accurate portrayal of ‘high-stakes’ 
fast-time decision making policing and detection tasks as experienced in real world 
situations. Following the simulation, the participants can then be shown an instant 
replay of their actions with full 20:20 hindsight. This allows immediate feedback on 
complex decision and action tasks. In addition, post-incident scrutiny can be played 
out over a much-extended timeline and thus decisions made in the heat of the moment 
can be inspected and vindicated (or made to look spectacularly unfounded in the harsh 
light of repeated playback). This technology is being put to use in the context of 
firearms training (e.g. Roberston, Bown, Robinson & Cronin, 2007) where officers in 
the so-called ‘shoot/no-shoot dilemma’ have literally a split second to make a decision 
to discharge a weapon or not. 
A similar, controlled, methodology for analysing more general decision 
making in real-time using realistic contexts can in principle be achieved by the 
development of CCTV control room ‘simulators’. Whilst there will always be natural 
scepticism from existing staff over the efficacy of such simulators, the potential 
benefits for training are considerable. Flight simulators are now considered and 
accepted (e.g., Caro, 1988; Moore, 2006) as essential components of crew training. 
The scope for creating unexpected events in unfolding situations, tied to the facility of 
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recording and reviewing crew interactions have proved invaluable in the development 
and enhancement of crew procedure and practice (e.g., North and Woodling, 1970; 
Foushee and Helmreich, 1988). The lessons from many years worth of vigilance 
research must be heeded in the development of a science of surveillance. In particular 
the good practice learned in mission-critical operations rooms such as radar centres, 
air-traffic control rooms etc. should continue to inform and develop the construction 
and management of CCTV control rooms.  
The problems for CCTV rooms are different to those facing more traditional 
areas of the vigilance literature however. This is due to the ever-increasing diversity 
of potential threats arising from international/domestic terrorism and the widening 
scope and variety of visual evidence to be scrutinised. Measuring the efficiency and 
effectiveness of a CCTV control room team and system as whole is fraught with 
difficulty but the issues arising in this type of activity are now the focus of attention of 
mainstream science. The emergence of the field of ‘Visual Analytics’ (Thomas and 
Cook, 2005) has served to delineate the conceptual and practical issues involved in 
protecting US homeland security using the full panoply of data created by modern 
social institutions. This move to maximise the utility of data streams is also a US 
based National Science Foundation / National Institutes of Health priority (Johnson, 
Moorhead, Munzner, Pfister, Rheingans, & Yoo, 2006). The new research teams 
being formed to research these areas cross the traditional boundaries of disciplines 
within science. In order to deliver the applied research benefits there needs to be a 
similar avoidance of artificial boundaries within the law-enforcement communities. 
The successful implementation will involve massive levels of data sharing, inter-
agency cooperation and cross-jurisdictional collaboration. 
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The recent UK legal proceedings surrounding the death of Jean Charles de 
Menezes has brought the issue of control room accountability (Cronin and Reicher, 
2006) into sharp relief. Investigators were concerned with the possibility of the noise 
of the busy control room adversely affecting the decision making of the senior 
officers charged with controlling the operation (IPCC, 2007). The combination of 
these external stressors combined with the intrinsic stressor of the difficult job in hand 
certainly would be expected to influence decision-making (Cronin, 2001). Results 
from existing literature are difficult to extrapolate to control room contexts because of 
the lack of applied research in this area, but battle planning simulations and flight 
simulation studies are relevant (Baldwin, 1994). However, because technology has 
transformed control rooms so much in the last 10 years, the fundamental perceptual 
and decision tasks are new. The information streams feeding into control rooms are 
multi-modal: the principal obvious change is the use of the ‘video-wall’ comprising 
multiple CCTV monitors situated at one end of a control room (in addition to a 
personal observation monitor). The increase in visual load is dramatic compared to 
pre-CCTV control rooms. The task of Visual Analytics (e.g., Thomas and Cook, 
2005) is to present the information in the optimal format. This format must 
incorporate information from multiple sound channels (telephones, camera feed, 
junior officers, surveillance teams, firearms teams) as well as the crucial video 
streams (minus the distractors). 
Effective use of ‘video-walls’ has only very recently come under widespread 
controlled investigation. In the context of aviation monitoring, Wickens, Muthard, 
Alexander, Van Olffen, Podczerwinski, (2003) have examined the influences of 
display visibility as a function of display-size and event-eccentricity (i.e., visibility for 
items viewed ‘out of the corner of the eye’). Display size does not appear to degrade 
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change detection per se, however, there is some evidence that hazard information 
presented at the periphery may be less easily spotted in extensive visual display 
formats (Wickens et al., 2003). Polys, Kim, & Bowman (2007) found that certain 
search tasks were better on widescreen views (despite the greater retinal eccentricity) 
of items in the periphery. Comparison tasks seem to be easier on smaller views (this 
finding is consistent with basic psychophysical research (e.g. Scott-Brown, Baker and 
Orbach, 2000)). Investigations are only now beginning to take account of the hitherto 
neglected role of eye-gaze patterns of CCTV operators on multi-screen displays 
during monitoring tasks (e.g., Troscianko, Gregory, Hawker, Bhatt, Porter, Lovell & 
Meese, 2007). 
The type of multidisciplinary applied research paradigms we have been 
discussing can and should be extended to the role of colour perception in surveillance. 
Over the past 10 years there has been a race to renew and upgrade CCTV systems to 
colour systems thanks to the belief that they will offer superior performance over their 
monochrome ancestors (Davies and Thasen, 2000). However the empirical evidence 
on face recognition performance suggests that no measurable benefits accrue with 
colour rendering (Bruce, Henderson, Greenwood, Hancock, Burton, & Miller, 1999). 
Despite this, it is assumed that identification performance for other aspects of the 
scene will be superior (such as in the description of clothes for example – ‘suspect is 
wearing a green jacket’). Under conditions of poor lighting, however, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that operators prefer monochrome settings to improve visibility and 
reduce confusability (personal observations from interviews with practitioners 
conducted by the authors). Under the restricted light wavelength emitted by sodium 
streetlights, and fluorescent shop lights, it is possible that colour CCTV footage may 
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in fact impair the ability to accurately describe clothing and other relevant suspect 
information.  
A substantial body of literature on expertise in sustained vigilance emerged 
largely as a result of the introduction of radar defence systems in the World War II 
(e.g., Mackworth, 1969; Ware, Baker, and Drucker, 1964). Radar represented an 
unusual challenge for human observers, namely one of watching an abstract display 
for many hours searching for minute changes in displays. Much has been learned 
about effective shift patterns and patterns of relief to enable sustained vigilance to be 
effective. Lifeguards at swimming pools are probably the most readily recognisable 
example of this expertise, with regular changes in ‘sentry’ duty designed to relieve the 
boredom of the task. Even in this task, mistakes do continue to happen and seemingly 
obvious incidents do occasionally go undetected (Urquhart, 2007). However the 
nature of the modern control room tasks mean that the scope of the vigilance task is 
much wider than the tasks previously studies (e.g. Caird et al., 2005). Hence, not all 
of the pre-existing literature is generalisable to this new form of surveillance. For 
example, the excellent work relating the differential loads placed on vigilance tasks 
by spatial and verbal working memory are documented by Caggiano and Parasuraman 
(2004) (amongst others) but the vigilance task in their experiment is simply to detect 
the change in orientation of a wrench. 
 
Practical, Training and Operational Implications 
In this section we show how the concepts reviewed above can be translated to 
policing related policy procedure and practice in surveillance related tasks such as 
control rooms. Unfortunately, the primary CCTV surveillance operator task is not 
perceived as high value (unlike a radar operator in World War II where errors of 
omission were disastrous), nor is it perceived as glamorous, high profile, or high in 
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social status. As a result, shift patterns in these roles reflect standard employment 
patterns in a ‘long-hours culture’, rather than reflecting the most appropriate 
allocation for the skilled task in hand. For example, a prototypical provincial control 
room would have a permanent staff of around 10 operators working a 37 hour week 
each meaning that probably at any time there are two individuals responsible for 
around 50 cameras. In a year this would typically face approximately 700 community 
safety incidents, leading to around 150 evidential tape submissions relating to about 
60 arrests, with around 1/3 of these directly attributable to the CCTV scheme. This 
means that the control room really only has to deal with perhaps only 2  incidents of 
significance per day (out of 16 hours worth of ‘person viewing time’, an effective 
incident rate of 1 every 8 hours (one for each person’s shift). In the context of a mass 
media, fast paced entertainment culture it is easy to see why this rate of action could 
be construed as rather boring. In this context, it is also easier to see why the role has 
been seen as low-status, and why operator recruitments exhibit a high-turn over. In 
terms of thrill and drama levels the day-to day experience is not as high-octane as the 
Battle of Britain, nor does the role have the social conspicuity of face-to-face policing 
or life-guarding. However, the incidents in July 2007 at Glasgow Airport for example, 
show that a modern control room anywhere in the UK may have to go on full 
emergency footing with zero notice.  
When looking at staff engagement, it may be more profitable in terms of 
efficiency to have a wider, more culturally diverse, pool of operators working for 
shorter, more varied, shifts but with more of a time overlap. The reality of staffing 
issues means that in order to achieve full coverage, staff often have to work more than 
the regular 8-hour shifts, and take overtime pay. Not all systems in the provinces have 
achieved 24-hour coverage, nor have they achieved two-operator coverage. Inevitably 
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the demographic profile of the operator pool is restricted. A wide cultural pool of staff 
effectively immunises the groups against the danger of inappropriate stereotypes that 
can arise from ‘in-group’ processing effects in narrow social groups (e.g., Brown, 
1996)[3]. Having a large, broad-based trained staff pool would make the team less 
vulnerable to depletions due to leaving, as more individuals would be available for 
cover. Staggered shift change-overs would help to ensure hand over of knowledge. To 
effect all of these changes, the decisions would have to be underpinned by a 
substantial and credible body of research informing policy, procedure and practice.  
Simple analysis of actual performance statistics cannot form the sole basis for 
developing best practice. As a result of the perceptual phenomena we have reviewed, 
not all the incidents that should be tracked are detected and noted. To compound 
matters, the operators and evaluators will naturally not know what incidents and 
events they have missed; worse still the operators will still feel that they are 
performing better than they are – and probably better than their peers too (as we saw 
with the example of ‘change blindness’ blindness above from Levin et al. (2000)). 
The solution, as we have discussed, is to build a research programme of training and 
research using ecologically valid simulators as part as a wider agenda of continuing 
professional enhancement in policing. A professional status for operators (as has been 
begun with door supervisors in the UK) would be the first step in creating a culture of 
enhancing career prospects for operators.  As the complexity of CCTV systems 
continues to evolve, the levels of expertise demanded of the operators is also 
continuously under upward pressure (e.g. camera control software problems are 
increasingly evident as systems move from simple analog to complex digital solutions 
(Hall, 2004)).  
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One other aspect of digital systems that tackles the staffing problems head on 
is of course the development of ‘smart systems’. The so-called ‘second generation’ 
surveillance systems (Surette, 2005) will apply computer vision monitoring software 
(e.g. Dee & Hogg, 2004; Fisher, Santos-Victor, and Crowley, 2005) to reduce activity 
on mundane operations and to trigger identification of potentially suspect behaviour. 
This should leave the operators free to have a more executive oversight of incoming 
material; but with the ability to drill down to the lowest levels of source material 
when the occasions demand. However, Surette (2005) notes that technology can result 
in cluttering up of the time available for the fulfilment of primary functions. In 
addition, it is noted that in order for such systems to be effective in the long term the 
detected behaviour must then be responded to. If the public become aware of a lack of 
response to independently observed crime then their faith in the overall system will be 
sorely tested. Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) already generates more 
‘hits’ (unlicensed vehicles) than can be ‘actioned’, but this system is not really 
compromised by lack of immediate follow up since illegal cars are not obvious to the 
public. However, ‘bus lane’ violations are automatically detected by a CCTV system 
in Aberdeen but, due to lack of resources in follow up, the system (very 
conspicuously) has only resulted in a 10% conviction rate (Urquhart, 2005), thus 
weakening the perceived efficacy of the CCTV system. If violent crime or robbery is 
widely seen to occur within the sight of CCTV, but is not seen to be followed up 
swiftly, then faith in mass surveillance really will be challenged. CCTV seems to 
deter deliberate criminal activity (or at least displace it). However, emotionally 
charged crime such as street brawls still occur regularly under the noses of 
surveillance cameras (Williams and Johnstone, 2000; Walker, Kershaw and Nicholas, 
Detect the unexpected: a science for surveillance. 
22  09/03/2008 
2006).  The lesson to take from these examples is that low-value or trivial data must 
be kept out of the system or it will impinge on the effectiveness of the system. 
In addition to the volume of information in the system, the way that 
information is communicated about suspects is vital to ensure that the relevant 
information is transmitted and irrelevant or potentially confusing information is 
restricted. Despite all the work already done on eye-witness memory (e.g., MacLin, 
Zimmerman, Meissner, MacLin, Tredoux & Malpass, 2008), much remains to be 
learned about the appropriate methods to achieve the best way of reporting categories 
of descriptions such as face, height, weight, age, skin-colour (race), hair style, 
clothing, clothing-colour, for events as they continue to unfold. In post-event 
interviews, the ‘cognitive interview’ technique has shown how rich, vivid and 
accurate recall can be under ideal circumstances with a trained interviewer 
(Geiselman, Fisher, MacKinnon, Holland (1986). However, in the live pursuit 
context, there is no such luxury of time. Therefore the selection of the salient 
information is absolutely essential. Incorrect, or vague or misleading descriptions can 
result in misidentifications which have potentially disastrous consequences (e.g. 
IPCC, 2007). 
It remains an empirical question as to what features observers should 
concentrate on when describing and relaying information about suspects: for example: 
gender, clothing and height etc.. Developing a robust standard descriptive 
terminology will be a vital first step forward in crime prevention, detection and arrest 
and prosecution. (e.g. to how to best describe structural features cheekbones, nose, 
hair style, clothing). This could and should be empirically determined. Such a 
methodology would alleviate the worst difficulties associated with the own-race-bias 
(see Meissner and Brigham, 2001 for a review) where inexperience in dealing with 
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the structural nuances of ‘unfamiliar-race’ faces can lead to a loss of discriminative 
power. By generating a consistent, widely accepted, lexicon of descriptive terms it 
should be possible to reduce inter-observer variation in descriptions and 
identifications and thus minimise false-alarms and maximise correct detections.  
 Information, of course, flows in various ways from control room to individuals 
on the ground. The bandwidth of information systems has dramatically increased so 
that actual video footage can be streamed to mobile devices ‘on the ground’. This has 
the benefit of removing the possibility for descriptions getting ‘lost in translation’ 
from image to phone or radio. Rather than simple ‘mug shot’ photographs, it is 
possible to provide multiple views of a face, or even moving head and shoulders 
shots, including full-face, ¾ and profile. So far, it is has not been shown that this 
additional information provides any substantial benefits for line-up judgments 
(Darling, Valentine, & Memon (2007). Because field work is typically very different 
to line-up judgments, additional research would be required to establish whether the 
additional time taken to transfer and then inspect multiple or moving views of a face 
would deliver real benefits in the field (presumably field agents would prefer to have 
the extra information). In the context of abstract data visualisation, most users prefer 
to see complex dimensions in a data set presentation (by adding colour, depth, motion 
etc.) rather than seeing simpler displays, but what is less clear is whether this 
preference actually enhances interpretative performance (e.g., Fischer, 2000). For 
example using 3-D depth from motion does not appear to help unusual data points 
‘emerge’ from data sets, yet users may well assume that they would be easier to see 
under 3-D conditions (Shovman, Szymkowiak, Bown and Scott-Brown, 2008). The 
additional time taken to inspect multiple views (or even a rotating view of a face) may 
not be practical in the context of fast-developing incidents on the ground. 
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The use of colour in descriptions is particularly amenable to a rigorous 
research agenda focussed on establishing precisely when and where it should be 
included in surveillance and in reporting contexts. In the context of face recognition, 
Bruce et al., (1999) showed that rendering unfamiliar faces in colour as opposed to 
monochrome gave no benefit in subsequent recall performance. Likewise, Scott-
Brown and Mann (2005) showed no colour benefit over monochrome for detection of 
suspicious behaviour. The reliability of colour as a tool in surveillance is almost 
universally assumed by the public (e.g. Davies and Thasen, 2000), yet video cameras 
do not accurately reproduce colour in all lighting contexts [4]. In conditions of poor 
light, these reproduction problems are particularly noticeable to the extent that some 
CCTV operators prefer to display images in monochrome even though they have 
colour systems (personal observations from interviews with practitioners conducted 
by the authors). As an evidence base in court, colour has obvious benefits for the 
purposes of identification. However, in the field and in ongoing surveillance and 
pursuit colour may potentially mislead the team if the equipment generates an illusion 
of colour specificity that is not reflected in the natural scene. In the context of multi 
agency pursuit and surveillance, as many as 1 in 6 of the team may have some form of 
anomalous colour vision (i.e. colour blindness, e.g. Blake and Sekuler, 2005) unless 
this is screened out at recruitment. Therefore, care must be taken not place unrealistic 
expectations on the precision of colour descriptions in surveillance context, 
particularly when lighting and reproduction systems can introduce large variations in 
perceived colour.  A continued effort in Applied Psychology can tell us about the 
usefulness of colour information in face recognition, it can also reveal how much 
about structural information of the face we could and should use in encoding and 
retrieval of face identification information from memory. 
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Operation rooms are only as good as the staff employed in them. Vast 
quantities of data that are recorded in any 24-hour period require interpretation and 
decisions as to whether behaviour is normal or not. As we have discussed above, one 
of the classic heuristics that humans use in such a complex task is the formation of 
stereotypes to simplify the world around them (e.g., Brown, 1996). This may have 
negative effects when looking for suspects and having little time to scrutinise large 
volumes of data. Williams and Johnstone (2000) note that CCTV operators are liable 
to ascribe negative stereotypes to social ‘outgroups’ (e.g. ‘hoodies’, ‘youths’), and 
consequently single out these groups for surveillance out of proportion to the threat 
that they pose [5]. This requires control rooms to be properly managed by trained staff 
who have an overview position and thus are able to moderate operator 
overzealousness. In the long term, appropriate training based on social diversity can 
eliminate much of the negative effect of inappropriate stereotyping. Spotting the out 
of the ordinary needs expert knowledge of the way things should look and the way 
people should behave. Much of this can be predictable if the observers know normal 
routines and details intimately. Indeed, experienced operators claim to ‘get a gut 
feeling’ about certain individuals or groups who are safe or dangerous (Manchester 
and London CCTV Staff, Personal communication 2006, 2007). Incidentally, this 
chimes with observations made by experts in other fields of visual expertise (see 
Gladwell, 2005 for an engaging overview). Shift patterns in control rooms can be 
arranged to exploit this expertise. Operators can be trained to have detailed local 
knowledge with a combination of in-control-room training and on-the-street 
familiarisation via vehicle and via walkabout. This would include night-time training, 
because streets that operators may know very well from daytime experience may be 
radically different at evenings and weekends. Only by experiencing the sights and 
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sounds of the target areas in person can operators have a true perspective of the area 
in its wider context when called upon to make real-time speeded decisions in rapidly 
emerging situations. 
Given the increased reliance on multiple camera systems, the individual 
operators do not have time to follow up every suspicious hunch played out in front of 
them. Currently most systems only store a time-lapse version of events from cameras 
that aren’t directly being observed on the operator PC monitor or on the ‘video wall’ 
of the control room. We suggest that a digital video ‘marking’ system could allow 
operators to flag up given camera views over time for subsequent (post-event) 
analysis if events do unfold in a more dramatic or unfortunate way. This would allow 
for full-frame full-motion storage of camera footage even if the operator then switches 
to other cameras for further searching. The ability to set a ‘mindsight marker’ (to use 
the terminology described by Rensink (2000) earlier) would be particularly useful in 
‘second-generation’ CCTV systems (Surette, 2005). By storing digital ‘markers’ or 
‘flags’ to events that do and do not escalate into full blown situations, it would be 
possible to retrospectively profile the ‘sensitivity’ (Green and Swets, 1966) of 
individual operators. The powerful statistical technique known as Signal Detection 
Theory assesses the proportion of ‘Hits’ to ‘False alarms’ (i.e. the ratio of correct 
detection versus ‘cry wolf’) has been seen to provide a powerful statistical tool for 
evaluating operator efficiency (Troscianko, Holmes, Stillman, Mirmehdi, Wright and 
Wilson, 2004). 
 
Discussion 
Modern surveillance technology is highly complex and powerful. However, this 
complexity is dwarfed by the complexity and power of the individual human visual 
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and cognitive decision making systems. Surveillance related tasks are set of course in 
intra-individual (individual identification), intra-group (junior and senior officer 
interactions) and inter group contexts (relations between the police and other groups). 
These added layers of complexity expand the overall problem exponentially in 
modern society. As technology advances and society becomes ever-larger and 
complex (e.g., Moore, 1965), our need to understand and unravel the growing 
complexity of the human interface also grows. The biggest strength of the human 
operator is to make conscious decisions, and apply the role of context to narrow down 
the computational complexity present in the incoming information. This strength also 
contains the flip-side of selective attention – namely the potential for too narrow a 
focus of attention via over-focussing or via attentional-set – leading to change 
blindness in the worst cases. Much practical insight can be gained by studying the 
system at work in relevant, cognitively demanding, situations. This essential process 
is beginning to happen in vision science (e.g. Troscianko et al., 2004). Only in this 
way, can the human-system interface be optimised to maximise correct detections, 
and minimise false alarms and incorrect decisions. 
Critical incident decision problems also exist for the operators and command 
staff who have detection and executive functions in a large CCTV control rooms. 
Modern city centre surveillance systems such as those installed in Manchester and 
London use state of the art equipment and highly skilled operators. However as 
technological capabilities improve over time, care must be taken to ensure that the 
keystone of the whole system – the human-machine interface – is also continuously 
improved to keep pace with hardware development. In particular developments must 
take account of the differential viewing characteristics of police, council and 
commercial users –each of which has different agendas or tasks (e.g. Cronin and 
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Reicher, 2006). Incidentally, in this context, the tendency for CCTV control rooms to 
be jointly run with council staff appears to be desirable on a number of levels (e.g. by 
broadening the range of stakeholders in a system and widening the institutional 
culture(s) within the control room environment).  
We are arguing for an enhancement in the way that police utilise individual 
and group level identifications, such that police officers (and other individuals) at 
strategic, tactical and operational levels of command are made aware of the improved 
possibilities of correct versus incorrect identifications by officers utilising the range of 
technology that is available to identify suspects in both individual and group/crowd 
situations. This requires an understanding of the need for operational staff to be made 
aware of the relevant psychological processes, and how they affect the work 
environment. This holistic approach should ensure that designers, procurers, managers 
and day to day operators are fully conversant with the issues that may arise in relying 
on this technology in policing activity including: investigation, use of 
information/intelligence, decisions to arrest and prosecute, and presentation of 
evidence in subsequent court proceedings. This would provide the best opportunity 
for all the elements of the Criminal Justice System to work together to ensure that 
investigations are as seamless as possible. 
This informed, scientific, approach to surveillance, detection and decision-
making, should feed into the public understanding of these processes. Misconceptions 
about process should be challenged, illusions explained, and processes better 
understood. In this way, public acceptance of surveillance will be enhanced or (at 
least maintained), and errors reduced or eliminated. In spite of the proliferation of 
CCTV, academic interest in the topic has been politely described as ‘rather slight’ by 
Williams and Johnstone (2000). However, insights uncovered in the context of an 
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experimental laboratory can have relevance to the decisions made by officers, support 
staff and others involved in policing both the daytime and night time economies.  
How these individual decisions are made, in the context of the groups that people 
work and operate in, will be a critical research area to investigate in the future. To be 
successful, the investigations should form part of a wide-ranging collaborative 
research agenda. Computer based surveillance simulators can give the experimental 
credibility required to convince the scientists whether policy, procedure and practice 
changes are measurably superior. If scientists are convinced, then they can try to 
convince the practitioners. Artificial simulators are an essential part of this process of 
quality enhancement because highly stretched policing authorities cannot afford to 
test a multitude of operational options by directly pitching ‘experimental trials’ 
straight into real operations rooms.  There is a requirement to try and assess the 
benefits via simulations in the first instance. These environments have no negative 
consequences for incorrect outcomes and the tests will not jeopardise mission critical 
events. 
A scientific approach to surveillance needs to incorporate reasoning and 
thought processes of the personnel throughout the organisation. This need has been 
most prominently advanced by scientists in the newly emerging field of ‘Visual 
Analytics’ (e.g., Thomas, & Cook, 2005). This discipline represents the convergence 
of cognitive sciences, mathematics and computer science in a concerted attempt to 
develop novel technological solutions to the ever-increasing volume and complexity 
of information streams. However much of the current research in this discipline is 
focussed on the development of new visualisation techniques based on exploiting the 
maximum power and complexity of modern computer graphics hardware and 
software largely for their own sake. A recent National Institutes of Health/National 
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Science Foundation (USA) report (Johnson et al., 2006) points out, however, that this 
is often done at the expense of ensuring a sufficient grounding in basic research (e.g., 
psychophysics, perception and cognition) or at the expense of servicing a clear and 
present need (e.g. medical engineering, fluid dynamics, surveillance). The best 
visualisation techniques need not necessarily be the most technologically advanced; 
they need to be the most suited to the abilities of the user and to be appropriate and 
clearly evaluated as reliable. Although Surette (2005) has already documented the 
genesis of second generation CCTV systems that automatically detect suspect 
behaviour. We suggest that the target should be ‘third generation’ systems that 
dynamically inform the monitoring and evaluation of the full data stream of 
information impinging on control rooms: video, audio, voice data, digital data, 
operational communications and so on.  
To make a visual analytic research agenda work, Police and related agencies 
must work as closely as possible to minimise the risk of important 
information/intelligence being lost in various policing information systems (as 
identified during the 9/11 Commission Report (e.g., Walker, 2004). At the same time, 
Police and related agencies must actively engage in research activities (e.g. UK: 
Scottish Institute for Policing Research, Home Office Scientific Development Branch, 
Surveillance, Evaluation, Research, Validation, and Exploitation (EPSRC Research 
Council Funded Network), US: Department of Homeland Security, The National 
Visualization and Analytics Center (NVAC™), National Institutes of Health, National 
Science Foundation).   
In sum, we are arguing for a programme FOR research rather than OF research 
dedicated to the need to understand these complex interactions. This requires 
investigators not to simply follow existing programmes of research; rather to develop 
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programme areas for research. For example topics for exploration could include: 
visual analytics; control room technology; decision making in structured groups; 
issues around accountability; issues relating to unfamiliar faces; performance under 
stress and fatigue, and so on. Future funding programmes should reflect these 
priorities and focus on uniting the outputs of different disciplines. Denzin (1988) 
makes the point that researchers should avoid being constrained by the methods they 
use when formulating their research questions. There can be a tendency/inclination for 
investigators only to measure what is easy to measure, or only to measure what they 
know how to measure (particularly when making the transition from the laboratory to 
the field). The halfway house from ‘lab’ to field is the immersive environment, it 
provides a very flexible extendible, inexhaustible method for training. In the same 
way the immersive environment permits data collection in a controlled manner (like 
the laboratory) but in more ecologically valid settings (like the real world). The 
quickest solution to avoiding the method trap posed by Denzin (1988) is to engage in 
multidisciplinary research (this builds capacity more quickly and with a larger scope 
than simply using a single investigator to ask all the questions). Multidisciplinary 
work is regularly used in vision science where neuroscience, behavioural science and 
psychophysics unite to triangulate their findings to reach new conclusions. To achieve 
such a programme FOR applied surveillance research, there needs to be better 
interaction between practitioners and academics – both by academics inviting 
practitioners into the laboratories and by police inviting researchers in to see the 
problems.  
In addition to ongoing research, there is a need for dissemination in language 
appropriate for field practitioners, policy makers, managers and the general public. 
Currently most research is published in academic psychological journals with a 
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limited readership – and is written in what can politely be described as a less than 
optimally accessible style for the non-specialist. Police and academic communications 
and collaborations should be seen as part of a wider agenda for the improved status of 
public understanding of science. Funding bodies already grade and evaluate research 
proposals with wider dissemination in mind, however they are in a position to 
engineer much closer collaborations by inviting or requiring collaborations as a 
condition of funding, or even as the basis of funding.  The first obligation of the 
research community is the dissemination of contemporary research to practitioners in 
a format that is both readily accessible and readily applicable. To date, this is an area 
that is sadly seen as a subsidiary priority in research laboratories across campuses; 
(Gladwell, 2005 and Wiseman, 2004) are notable exceptions.  
The key message for surveillance practitioners and policymakers is 
fundamentally about the nature of the human visual system. There is a preconception 
in the media, and the public in general, that the eye and brain act like a camera, and 
that human memory acts like a video recorder – slavishly recording the perceived 
events with 100% accuracy and in hi resolution format. The brain then dutifully 
evaluates the information incoming and provides error free analysis. Of course the 
reality is that the human brain’s solution to the complexity of the environment is to 
use short-cuts, heuristics, and even stereotypes to simplify the decision making 
process (as so vividly described by Gladwell, (2005) who gives the process the name 
of ‘thin-slicing’). Most of the time this works reasonably effectively but often in the 
modern world, our cognitive apparatus is not up to the job.  The sooner we can fully 
document and understand the limitations of the human apparatus, the sooner we can 
develop better strategies for effective and efficient surveillance in the context of an 
overall policing strategy. 
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Whether the detection is made by humans or by machine, a greater 
quantification of the limits of human performance underpinned by a theoretically well 
founded understanding of the evolutionary context of violent behaviour (Buss, 1999; 
New, Cosmides and Tooby 2007; Scott-Brown and Cronin, 2007) can help operators 
and police in interpreting and understanding the events unfolding before them. The 
message is that we should not allow ourselves to be seduced by the technology. It is 
all too easy to assume that bigger, more-vivid, displays with more information will 
allow transmission of more information, but there is only so much that we can attend 
to. In conclusion an informed research based awareness of the consequences of 
attentional focus  (e.g., attentional set, retrieval induced forgetting) the potential for 
misperception (e.g., change blindness, inattentional blindness, change blindness 
blindness) and the shortcuts used by our brains (e.g., stereotypes, thin-slicing) is the 
best defence against misdirection and complexity in the modern security and policing 
environment.      Word Count [8540] 
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Footnotes:  
[1] [Engaging and entertaining examples of the flicker paradigm are available from 
Ron Rensink’s website. http://www.psych.ubc.ca/~rensink/flicker/] 
 
[2] [Some excellent and amusing examples of these experiments are available to view 
on line at Dan Simons website: 
http://viscog.beckman.uiuc.edu/djs_lab/demos.html] 
 
[3] [The ‘contact hypothesis’ suggests that intergroup differences and conflict can be 
reduced by constructive contact with ‘outgroup members’ (Brown, 1996).] 
 
[4] [This misplaced faith in colour is another example of a ‘metacognitive error’ just 
like the change blindness blindness error described by Levin, et al., (2000) 
earlier.] 
 
[5] [The efficacy of these stereotypes can be self-reinforcing since they generate 
recordable actions and the ‘misses’ don’t usually show up anywhere in crime 
statistics.] 
 
